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Over the past two decades, technological progress in the United States has
been biased towards skilled labor. What does this imply for business cycles? We
construct a quarterly skill premium from the CPS and use it to identify skill-biased
technology shocks in a VAR with long-run zero and sign restrictions. Hours fall in
response to skill-biased technology shocks, indicating that part of the technology-
induced fall in hours is due to a compositional shift in labor demand. Investment-
speciﬁc technology shocks reduce the skill premium, indicating that capital and
skill are not complementary in aggregate production.
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1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, technological progress has been biased towards making
skilled labor more productive. The evidence for this ﬁnding is based on the marked
increase in the skill premium in the US and many other industrialized countries starting
in the early 1980s, which coincided with a substantial rise in the average education
level of the workforce. This parallel increase in the price and quantity of skill points
towards an increase in the demand for skilled workers that exceeded the increase in their
supply, suggesting that newly developed production technologies require relatively more
educated and fewer uneducated workers (Katz and Murphy (1992); Autor et al. (1998);
Acemoglu (2002); Autor et al. (2005) and Autor et al. (2008)).
This paper documents a set of stylized facts about the implications of skill-biased
technological change for business cycle ﬂuctuations. To our knowledge, this paper is
the ﬁrst to undertake this task. The lack of interest in skill-biased technology in the
business cycle literature is surprising given the large number of studies dedicated to
the eﬀect of this type of technological progress on growth and inequality. Our results
show that allowing for skill bias in technological change is important to understand
business cycles and in particular speak to two important debates in the macroeconomics
literature. First, traditional identifying restrictions, which are justiﬁed in models with
homogeneous labor, may give a misleading picture of the eﬀect of technology shocks on
the economy. In particular, we show that the fall in hours in response to improvements
in technology is due at least in part to a compositional shift in labor demand from
unskilled to skilled workers. Second, we show that the response of the economy to skill-
biased technology shocks implies restrictions on the production technology that are of
interest to macroeconomists studying growth as well as business cycles. In particular,
we ﬁnd that investment-speciﬁc technological change reduces the skill premium. These
results reject the hypothesis that there is capital-skill complementarity in the aggregate
production function.1 INTRODUCTION 3
Following previous studies on skill-biased technological progress, we identify skill-
biased technology shocks from their eﬀect on the skill premium. To this end, we con-
struct a time series for the skill premium, which was so far not available at a quarterly
frequency. Using the Current Population Survey (CPS) outgoing rotation groups, we
calculate the skill premium as the log ratio of wages of college graduate equivalent work-
ers over high school graduate equivalents, controlling for experience and other observable
worker characteristics. In combination with comparable measures for the relative hours
of skilled workers, these series give a good picture of the high frequency movements in
the price and quantity of skill in the US over the 1979:I-2006:II period.
We use a structural vector autoregression (VAR) to estimate the response of the
economy to technology shocks, identifying technology shocks using long-run zero and
sign restrictions. We ﬁnd evidence for substantial skill bias in technological change at
business cycle frequencies. This ﬁnding is novel and somewhat surprising, given that
the skill premium is roughly acyclical over our sample period, which seems to suggest
that skill-biased technological change is not relevant for business cycle ﬂuctuations.1
However, in the presence of multiple shocks, unconditional correlations are the result of
a mixture of responses, which obscures the eﬀects of changes in technology.2 The struc-
tural VAR allows us to estimate the response of the economy conditional on technology
shocks. This exercise delivers two sets of results.
For our ﬁrst set of results, described in more detail in section 3, we propose a long-run
restriction to separately identify skill-biased technology shocks. Part of this restriction
is a long-run zero restriction, as in Blanchard and Quah (1989): we argue that skill-
biased technology shocks are the only shocks that aﬀect the skill premium in the long
1This interpretation seems to be supported by the fact that the skill premium is negatively correlated
with the relative supply of skilled labor at business cycle frequencies. For example, Acemoglu (2002)
and Autor et al. (2005) argue this observation indicates that ﬂuctuations in the skill premium are driven
by ﬂuctuations in the supply of skill rather than its demand.
2Lindquist (2004) reaches a similar conclusion, although from a completely diﬀerent exercise.
Lindquist argues that skill bias in technology shocks, generated by investment-speciﬁc technology shocks
and capital-skill complementarity in the aggregate production function, explains the cyclical behavior
of the skill premium. We discuss his argument in more detail in section 4.3.1 INTRODUCTION 4
run. We complement this zero restriction with two sign restrictions. First, we require
that skill-biased technology shocks, which are shocks to the demand for skill, aﬀect the
skill premium and the relative hours of skilled labor in the same direction. This rules
out shocks to the supply of skilled labor, which also aﬀect the skill premium in the long
run. Second, we require that skill-biased technology shocks aﬀect the skill premium and
productivity in the same direction. This rules out technology shocks biased towards
unskilled labor, which increase productivity but decrease the skill premium (or vice
versa). We identify all other technology shocks as the remaining shocks that permanently
change labor productivity, following Gal´ ı (1999). These other technology shocks include
skill-neutral as well as unskill-biased shocks. We ﬁnd that skill-biased improvements in
technology cause a decline in total hours worked. This ﬁnding suggests that the fall
in hours in response to technology shocks, which has been interpreted as evidence for
price rigidities, is due at least in part to a compositional shift in labor demand towards
skilled workers.
Our second set of results, described in Section 4, concerns the following question:
What kind of changes in the aggregate production function best describe the skill-biased
improvements in technology we observe over the past two decades? In a production func-
tion that takes capital, skilled and unskilled labor as inputs, a change in productivity
must be either a change in total factor productivity (TFP) or capital, skilled labor
or unskilled labor augmenting technological change. Whereas changes in TFP are al-
ways skill-neutral, both capital and skilled labor augmenting technological change may
increase the relative demand for skilled labor, depending on the elasticities of substitu-
tion between the diﬀerent inputs. Krusell et al. (2000) argue that capital and skill are
complements in the aggregate production function, and that skill-biased technological
change is the result of an increase in the relative productivity of the investment-goods
producing sector.3 Our results cast doubt on this hypothesis.
3It is a well-documented fact that, over the same period that the skill premium has risen, the relative
price of investment goods (software, equipment structures) has fallen substantially, providing evidence
for investment-speciﬁc technological change (Gordon (1990); Greenwood et al. (1997); Cummins and1 INTRODUCTION 5
In order to explore the issue of capital-skill substitutability, we include both the
skill premium and the relative price of investment goods in the VAR. We use the latter
to identify investment-speciﬁc technology shocks, following Fisher (2006), as the only
shocks that aﬀect the relative price of investment in the long run. An investment-
speciﬁc improvement in technology lowers the relative price of investment goods. The
remaining shocks that aﬀect labor productivity in the long run, are then investment-
neutral technology shocks. We ﬁnd that investment-speciﬁc technology shocks reduce
the skill premium, while investment-neutral technology shocks have a positive eﬀect on
this variable. Using a simple two-sector real business cycle model that is consistent
with our identifying restrictions, we explore what value of the elasticity of substitution
between capital and high skilled labor corresponds to these estimates. For diﬀerent
values of the elasticity of substitution, we simulate data from the model and use those
to estimate our structural VAR. We obtain the best match of the response of the skill
premium to investment-speciﬁc shocks in the model-simulated data to the response
estimated from actual data, if we assume capital and skill are substitutable.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our empirical
approach. We deﬁne the diﬀerent shocks to the production technology that we consider
and discuss how to identify the eﬀects of these shocks using long-run restrictions. We
also describe the data that are necessary to estimate these eﬀects and present some
descriptive statistics on the cyclicality of our quarterly series for the skill premium and
the relative supply and employment of skill. In Section 3 we describe the properties of
skill-biased technology shocks using the structural VAR analysis. Section 4 discusses
our evidence against capital-skill complementarity in aggregate production. Section 5
concludes.
Violante (2002)). Krusell et al. (2000) show that if capital and skilled labor are suﬃciently complemen-
tary, investment-speciﬁc technological progress can explain the increasing trend in the skill premium,
because the increase in the capital-labor ratio makes skilled labor relatively more productive.2 EMPIRICAL APPROACH 6
2 Empirical Approach
In this section, we outline our approach to estimate the implications of skill-biased
technological progress for the business cycle. We start by deﬁning diﬀerent types of
of technological change, discussing various speciﬁcations for the aggregate production
function. Next, we explain how to identify these diﬀerent technology shocks from the
data using either the functional form of the production function or a VAR with long-
run restrictions. Finally, we describe the data needed for the identiﬁcation, including
quarterly series for the skill premium and the relative supply and employment of skilled
labor, which we construct from micro data.
2.1 Shocks to the production technology
Consider an aggregate production function for output Yt that takes capital Kt, high
skilled labor Ht and low skilled labor Lt as inputs. The production function satisﬁes the
standard conditions: it is increasing and concave in all its arguments and homogenous of
degree one so that there are constant returns to scale. Shocks to total factor productivity
are neutral technology shocks, in the sense that they aﬀect the productivity of all inputs
in the same proportion. To allow for skill-biased technological change, the literature has
typically assumed an aggregate production function of the following form (see e.g. Katz













There are three technology parameters in this production function: At is neutral, BH,t
skilled labor augmenting and BL,t unskilled labor augmenting technology. Increases in
At are improvements in skill-neutral technology (SNT). Increases in BH,t and BL,t can
be skill or unskill-biased, depending on the elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled labor σ > 0. If high and low skilled labor are substitutes rather than com-
plements (σ > 1), the substitution eﬀect of improvements in skilled labor augmenting2 EMPIRICAL APPROACH 7
technology dominates the income eﬀect so that an increase in BH,t increases the demand
for skill and therefore the skill premium (assuming the supply curve for skill is downward
sloping) and an increase in BL,t decreases the skill premium. The consensus estimate
for σ is around 1.5 (see Katz and Murphy (1992), Ciccone and Peri (2006), Teulings
and van Rens (2008)), so that we can think of skill-biased technology (SBT) shocks as
changes in BH,t and unskill-biased technology (UBT) shocks as changes in BL,t. Note
that both positive SBT shocks and negative UBT shocks increase the skill premium, but
the two shocks are conceptually diﬀerent. Positive technology shocks, whether to At,
BH,t or BL,t represent improvements in technology that raise total factor productivity,
whereas negative technology shocks of all types reduce productivity.
There are two ways to interpret skill-biased technology shocks to an aggregate pro-
duction function as in (1). If the production function for all goods in the economy is
the same, then we can think of an increase in BH,t as a technological development that
makes skilled labor more productive in all sectors. Alternatively, we may think that the
production in diﬀerent sectors i requires skilled labor in diﬀerent proportions βi of total
labor input. In this case, even if skilled and unskilled labor are neither substitutes nor
complements within each sector,4 a sector-speciﬁc technology shock to a skill-intensive
sector would still increase the skill premium.
A particularly interesting case is an economy that consists of a consumption goods
producing sector and an investment goods producing sector. In this economy there are
two mechanisms, by which sector-speciﬁc shocks may aﬀect the skill premium. First,
the input shares for skill might be diﬀerent across the two sectors as explained above.
Second, because investment goods are used to build up capital, which is an input in the
production process, sector-speciﬁc shocks aﬀect the capital-labor ratio used in produc-
tion. If capital and skill are complements, as argued by Krusell et al. (2000), then a
higher capital labor ratio increases the relative demand for skilled labor and therefore
the skill premium.
4This is the case where σi = 1 for all i. In the limit for σ → 1, production function (1) becomes
Cobb-Douglas, so that changes in BH,t and BL,t are indistinguishable from changes in At.2 EMPIRICAL APPROACH 8
Suppose the two sectors have identical production functions except for a diﬀerence
in total factor productivity. In this case, as shown among others by Fisher (2006) and
Krusell et al. (2000), the economy can be aggregated to a one-sector economy, where
total output is divided between consumption and investment,
Yt = Ct + ptIt (2)
where decreases in the relative price of investment goods pt reﬂect technological improve-
ments in the investment goods producing sector or investment-biased technology (IBT)
shocks. An aggregate production function that allows for capital-skill complementarity
is a slightly generalized version of (1), where At now denotes not only skill-neutral but





















The elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor σ now also measures the
elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labor, whereas ρ is the elasticity
of substitution between capital and skilled labor. As shown by Krusell et al. (2000),
improvements in investment-speciﬁc technology (positive IBT shocks) increase the skill
premium if and only if the elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled labor ρ
is lower than the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labor σ, i.e. if
there is capital-skill complementarity in production.
2.2 Identiﬁcation and estimation
Under the assumption that workers’ wages are proportional to their marginal prod-
uct, we can calculate the skill premium directly from the production function. Using2 EMPIRICAL APPROACH 9




























where wH,t and wL,t are the wages of high and low skilled workers respectively. This
equation can be interpreted as a demand curve for skill. The skill premium is decreasing
in the relative demand for high skilled workers, log(Ht/Lt), where the elasticity of
demand depends on the elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled workers.
Changes in skill-biased technology BH,t or unskill-biased technology BL,t represent shifts
of the skill demand curve or skill demand shocks.
The ﬁrst, and easiest, way to estimate shocks to the relative demand for skill is a type
of production function decomposition. Since the skill premium and the relative quan-
tity of skill are observable, these shocks can be calculated directly from equation (4),
using an estimate for the elasticity of substitution between low and high skilled workers
σ.5 This approach, the results of which are described in Section 3.1, has two disadvan-
tages. First, we cannot separately identify skill-biased and unskill-biased improvements
in technology. This is problematic, because the eﬀects of an improvement in skill-biased
technology and a deterioration in unskill-biased technology on the economy are likely to
be quite diﬀerent, even though both lead to an increase in the skill premium. Second,
the estimates for the skill-biased technology shocks obtained this way are identiﬁed from
the assumption that wages are proportional to marginal products. This assumption is
not problematic if labor markets (and product markets) are perfectly competitive and
the wage of all workers equals their marginal product. If there are frictions in the labor
market, the weaker assumption that wages are proportional to marginal products still
holds approximately. However, if there are frictions in the wage determination process,
then wages may deviate from marginal products in the short run. In order to address
the second issue, we will use only long-run eﬀects to identify skill-biased technological
5An estimate for the share parameter β is unnecessary since this parameter aﬀects only the level of
BH,t and BL,t, and we normalize the mean and variance of the shocks to zero and one respectively.2 EMPIRICAL APPROACH 10
progress. To address the ﬁrst issue, we use the additional restriction that improvements
in technology increase productivity.
We implement our identiﬁcation strategy using a structural VAR with long-run re-
strictions. Consistent with equation (4), we identify skill-biased and unskill-biased tech-
nology shocks as the only shocks that aﬀect the skill premium in the long run, conditional
on the supply of skill. Since the identifying restriction is an assumption on the long-run
eﬀects of the structural shocks on the variables in the VAR, it is a weaker assumption
than assuming that (4) holds in each period and makes the estimates robust to, for
example, wage rigidities. In addition, the long-run identiﬁcation does not depend on
the exact functional form of the production function and we no longer need to use an
estimate for σ.6 In Section 3.2, we compare the estimated technology shocks using long-
run restrictions to the estimated shocks using the production function decomposition
described above and ﬁnd that the diﬀerences are small.
To separately identify skill-biased and unskill-biased technology shocks, we use a
long-run sign restriction on the response of productivity in addition to the long-run zero
restriction on the response of the skill premium.7 In addition, we use a second long-run
sign restriction to separate skill-biased technology shocks from exogenous changes in the
supply of skilled labor, which may also aﬀect the skill premium in the long run. We
implement these additional restrictions, which are described in more detail in Sections
3.3 and 3.4, only in the structural VAR, because it would be impossible to do in the
context of a production function decomposition. The results, described in Section 3.5,
show that the sign restrictions aﬀect the results substantially, indicating that there were
skill-biased as well as unskill-biased technology shocks and skill supply shocks over the
6Of course the assumption is not valid for all production functions. For example, with capital-skill
complementarity, as in (3), any shocks that aﬀect the capital stock also aﬀect the skill premium in the
long run. However, the restriction can easily be modiﬁed to incorporate this case, see section 4.
7Alternatively, we could have exclusively used sign restrictions, imposed on a broader range of
frequencies, as in Uhlig (2005) and Dedola and Neri (2007). We opt for a long-run zero restrictions in
combination with a sign restriction because we believe that any assumption on the short run behavior
of the skill premium would be more problematic than the assumption that only skill-biased technology
shocks aﬀect the premium in the long run.2 EMPIRICAL APPROACH 11
sample period.
The estimation of structural shocks using long-run zero and sign restrictions is im-
plemented in two steps. First, we estimate a reduced form VAR in the variables labor
productivity, total hours worked, the skill premium, relative hours of skilled workers
and in some speciﬁcations also the relative price of investment goods. Second, we map
the reduced form coeﬃcients and residuals into structural coeﬃcients by means of our
identifying restrictions.8 Our baseline VAR includes 8 lags and is estimated on quarterly
data from 1979:I to 2006:II. All variables are used in ﬁrst diﬀerences in order to allow
for unit roots.9 The baseline speciﬁcation includes labor productivity, hours worked,
skill premium and relative hours of skilled workers. In Section 3.7, we show that our
results are robust to adding other variables, such as consumption and investment. In
order to identify investment-speciﬁc technology shocks, we further include the relative
price of investment goods into the VAR in Section 4.
We use a Bayesian VAR to estimate the reduced form and employ a prior on the
coeﬃcients of the lagged variables, similar to Canova et al. (2010). This prior is a
type of Minnesota or Litterman prior, reﬂecting the belief that the true data generating
process for each variable is a univariate unit root, so that in ﬁrst diﬀerences the variables
are serially uncorrelated. It is implemented as a prior that the lag coeﬃcients in the
VAR are close to zero, where the strength of the prior increases with the lag order.10
The prior makes our estimation results more stable in the presence of high frequency
variation in the skill premium that is due to measurement error. The prior does not
aﬀect the long-run restrictions in any way and we show that our results are robust to
8Please refer to the Technical Appendix for details on the implementation of these restrictions.
9In the context of the identiﬁcation of neutral technology shocks, there has been a debate in the
literature whether hours worked should be included in levels (Christiano et al. (2003)) or in ﬁrst
diﬀerences (Gal´ ı and Rabanal (2004)). Canova et al. (2010) show that once the very low frequencies
are purged out from the data, the results of Gal´ ı (1999) are robust to using hours worked in levels. We
show in section 3.7 that our results are robust to using hours worked in levels even if we do not ﬁlter
out the low frequencies.
10The strength of the prior increases with lag length to reﬂect the belief that the higher order lags
are less likely to matter. This is imposed in form of a harmonic decay of the prior variance on the lag
coeﬃcients. Apart from the decay, the prior employed is quite loose. The Technical Appendix provides
more information on the speciﬁcation.2 EMPIRICAL APPROACH 12
the strength of the prior and to estimating the reduced form VAR using ordinary least
squares.
2.3 Data
We construct quarterly series for the skill premium and the relative hours worked and
supply of skill using individual-level wage and education data from the CPS outgoing
rotation groups. This survey has been administered every month since 1979 so that our
series runs from 1979:I to 2006:II.11 Wages are usual hourly earnings (weekly earnings
divided by usual weekly hours for weekly workers) and are corrected for top-coding and
outliers. We limit our sample to wage and salary workers between 16 and 64 years old
in the private, non-farm business sector and weight average wages by the CPS-ORG
sampling weights as well hours worked in order to replicate aggregate wages as close as
possible. Education is measured in ﬁve categories (less than high school, high school
degree, some college, college degree, more than college) and made consistent over the
full sample period following Jaeger (1997).12 We use these data to construct the skill
premium as the log wage diﬀerential between college graduates and high school grad-
uates, controlling for other sources of observable heterogeneity. In an average quarter,
we have wage and education data for about 35,000 workers.13
The other data series we use in our analysis are the following. Output is non-
farm business output per capita of all persons from the national income and product
accounts (NIPA). Hours per capita are hours of non-supervisory workers in the non-farm
business sector from the Current Employment Statistics establishment survey, corrected
11The BLS started asking questions about earnings in the outgoing rotation group (ORG) surveys in
1979. The March supplement goes back much further (till 1963), but does not allow to construct wage
series at higher frequencies than annual. The same is true for the May supplement, the predecessor of
the earnings questions in the ORG survey.
12The most important change in the education question occurs in 1992. Until 1991, educational
attainment is coded as years of schooling. From 1992, the coding is based on the degree. As a result,
there are some jumps in the fractions of workers in each educational category in this year. We correct
these jumps by imposing that the fractions of workers in each of the 5 categories do not change from
1991:IV to 1992:I beyond what may be expected based on seasonal eﬀects and a slow-moving trend.
13Please refer to the Technical Appendix for details on the construction of the skill premium.3 SKILL-BIASED TECHNOLOGY SHOCKS 13
to be representative for the entire workforce including supervisors. Labor productivity
is output per hour. All three series are available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) productivity and cost program. As the relative price of investment goods, we
use a quarterly intrapolation of the quality adjusted NIPA deﬂator for producer durable
equipment over the consumption deﬂator. These data were constructed by DiCecio
(2009), extending the series by Fisher (2006) and based on the annual data constructed
by Gordon (1990) and Cummins and Violante (2002).14
Table 1 shows business cycle statistics for the skill premium, the relative hours worked
and supply of skill, output, hours, productivity and the relative price of investment goods
for our estimation sample 1979:I to 2006:II. The skill premium is basically acyclical: it
is only very mildly positively correlated with output and productivity. This ﬁnding
is consistent with previous studies (Keane and Prasad (1993); Lindquist (2004)). The
relative supply of skill is acyclical as well, but the relative hours of skill are higher in
recessions than in booms, indicating the presence of a composition bias in employment
as argued by Solon et al. (1994). The correlation of the skill premium with the relative
investment-price is negative and insigniﬁcant. This is a ﬁrst indication that capital-
skill complementarity does not seem an important feature of the data at business cycle
frequencies.
3 Skill-biased technology shocks
In this section, we present our results for the eﬀects of technology shocks on aggregate
variables. We start with a simple production function decomposition, which allows
estimating shocks that aﬀect the skill premium, but not for separately identifying skill
demand shocks (technology shocks) versus skill supply shocks, and skill-biased versus
unskill-biased technology shocks. We then estimate the same shocks again, this time
14We thank Ricardo DiCecio for making these data available to us. The Technical Appendix de-
scribes the time-series properties of the data that are relevant for the speciﬁcation of the VAR such as
autocorrelations, integration and cointegration properties.3 SKILL-BIASED TECHNOLOGY SHOCKS 14
using a structural VAR with long-run restrictions and ﬁnd that the estimates are very
similar. The structural VAR framework allows for additional restrictions to separate
out skill supply shocks and unskill-biased technology shocks. Imposing these restrictions
gives rise to our baseline estimates in Section 3.5. Finally, we report responses to skill-
biased technology shocks for some additional variables and explore the robustness of our
results.
3.1 Production function decomposition
Our ﬁrst estimates of skill and unskill-biased shocks are constructed using a simple
decomposition based on the production function, as described in Section 2.2. This
decomposition is similar in spirit to a Solow residual and requires a value for the elasticity
of substitution between high and low skilled workers σ. We use σ = 1.5, which is the
consensus estimate from the literature based on several diﬀerent data sources (Katz and
Murphy (1992), Ciccone and Peri (2006), Teulings and van Rens (2008)). With this
value, we can use equation (4) to retrieve changes in skill and unskill-biased technology
log(BH,t/BL,t) from our data on the skill premium and the relative hours of skill. For
comparability with the identiﬁed shocks from a structural VAR in the continuation of
this section, we demean these changes and normalize their variance to unity.
In order to obtain impulse responses of aggregate variables to skill and unskill-
biased technology shocks, we regress these variables on lags of the estimated shocks,
as suggested by Basu et al. (2006). This is a direct estimate of the moving average
representation of the impulse response functions and the results are comparable to the
impulse responses from a VAR. Since the impulse responses seem to ﬂatten out after
about 6 quarters, we use 6 lags of the shocks. The results are presented in the ﬁrst row
of Figure 1. Not surprisingly, skill and unskill-biased technology shocks estimated in
this manner increase the skill premium. On average, these shocks seem to have little
eﬀect on productivity and hours worked.
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seems inconsistent with our interpretation of these shocks as technology shocks. How-
ever, it is important to remember that there are two types of technology shocks that
aﬀect the skill premium. Positive skill-biased technology shocks, i.e. increases in BH,t,
and negative unskill-biased technology shocks, i.e. decreases in BL,t, both increase the
skill premium, but have opposite eﬀects on productivity. Our estimates indicate that
over the sample period, both types of shocks were present, and the increase in produc-
tivity driven by positive SBT shocks was compensated by a decrease in productivity
driven by UBT shocks.15 In Section 3.3, we describe an additional restriction to sep-
arately identify skill-biased technology shocks BH,t. Since this restriction can only be
imposed in the context of a structural VAR, we ﬁrst make sure we can replicate the re-
sults from the production function decomposition in a VAR with long-run restrictions.
3.2 Long-run restrictions
Identifying skill and unskill-biased technology shocks from their long-run eﬀects on the
relative price of skill is consistent with skill demand equation (4), but more general
because we do not require this equation to hold true in each period. The long-run
restriction we use is similar in spirit to the identiﬁcation of investment-biased technology
shocks as shocks that aﬀect the relative price of investment goods proposed by Fisher
(2006). Skill and unskill-biased technology shocks identiﬁed in this manner may or may
not aﬀect labor productivity. Skill-neutral technology shocks, following Gal´ ı (1999),
are all remaining shocks that aﬀect labor productivity in the long run. We implement
these assumptions by ordering the respective variables subsequently in the VAR. Our
identiﬁcation scheme is strictly speaking is not a decomposition of technology shocks into
skill and unskill-biased versus skill-neutral shocks. In principle, there might be shocks
that aﬀect the skill premium but not labor productivity in the long run. However, as
explained in Section 2.1, it is hard to imagine non-technology shocks other than changes
15The Technical Appendix discusses this issue in more detail and argues that UBT shocks were
particularly important in the post-2000 period.3 SKILL-BIASED TECHNOLOGY SHOCKS 16
in the skill supply that aﬀect the skill premium in the long run (we address the issue of
skill supply shocks in Section 3.4).
For comparability with the results from the production function decomposition, we
ﬁrst regress the skill premium, labor productivity and total hours worked on 6 lags of
the identiﬁed skill and unskill-biased shocks from the structural VAR. The responses
obtained in this manner are presented in row 2 of Figure 1. By the identifying assump-
tion, positive skill-biased and negative unskill-biased shocks drive the skill premium up
in the long run. The estimates indicate that this eﬀect is realized immediately on im-
pact. The response of labor productivity to skill and unskill-biased shocks identiﬁed
using long-run restrictions is very similar to its response to the same shocks estimated
from a production function decomposition as well. This result indicates that equation
(4) is a good description of skill demand at all frequencies, not only in the long run. It
also shows that the structural VAR identiﬁes the same skill and unskill-biased shocks
as a decomposition using the production function, mirroring a similar equivalence result
for neutral technology shocks in Basu et al. (2006).
Rows 3 and 4 in Figure 1 show the responses of the skill premium, productivity
and hours worked to one-standard deviation skill and unskill-biased and skill-neutral
technology shocks, calculated directly from the coeﬃcient estimates of the VAR. Here,
as in all graphs that will follow, we present the median as well as the 16th and 84th
percentiles of the posterior distribution of the structural impulse-response coeﬃcients,
following Uhlig (2004). The responses to skill and unskill-biased shocks estimated in
this manner are again very similar to the responses to shocks from production function
decomposition. Skill-neutral technology shocks have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the skill
premium at any horizon (by assumption, there is no eﬀect in the long run). The response
of productivity and hours to these shocks looks very similar to the response of these
variables to identiﬁed technology shocks from a VAR without skill-biased shocks, as in
Gal´ ı (1999).16
16In the Technical Appendix, we replicate the estimates in Gal´ ı (1999) and show that the results are3 SKILL-BIASED TECHNOLOGY SHOCKS 17
3.3 Unskill-biased technology shocks
How to separately identify skill-biased from unskill-biased technology shocks? From skill
demand equation (4) it is clear that improvements in skill-biased technology BH,t and
deteriorations in unskill-biased technology BL,t raise the price of skill in the same way. It
is not possible, therefore, to separately identify each type of technological change using
data on the skill premium alone. However, using data on labor productivity, the sign
of technology shocks is observable: positive technology shocks increase and negative
technology shocks decrease productivity, see production function (1). We implement
this observation as a sign restriction. For the same reasons as set out in Section 3.2, we
impose this sign restriction only on the long-run response of labor productivity, although
the results change very little if we impose the restriction at other horizons as well. We
identify skill-biased technology shocks as those shocks that aﬀect the skill premium in
the same direction as labor productivity in the long run. Other technology shocks, which
aﬀect labor productivity in the long run, may be unskill-biased or skill-neutral.
Because skill-biased, unskill-biased and skill-neutral technology shocks are linearly
dependent, it is not possible to identify all three shocks separately. For example, an
increase in unskill-biased technology BL,t, which increases productivity and decreases
the skill premium, is observationally equivalent to the combination of a decrease in
skill-biased technology BH,t, which decreases the skill premium, and an increase in skill-
neutral technology At, which increases productivity. Therefore, we separately identify
skill-biased technology shocks and refer to the remaining technology shocks as ‘other’
technology shocks, which include both unskill-biased and skill-neutral shocks.
We implement this identiﬁcation scheme by assuming that only technology shocks
may aﬀect labor productivity and the wage premium in the long-run (usual long-run
zero restrictions). We then impose sign restrictions on the long-run variance between
these two variables in order to separate skill-biased technology from other technology
robust to changing the sample to our time period and to adding the skill premium as an additional
variable, and that they diﬀer very little from the responses presented here.3 SKILL-BIASED TECHNOLOGY SHOCKS 18
shocks. The Technical Appendix provides more details on this procedure.
3.4 Shocks to the supply of skill
In the identiﬁcation of technology shocks, we have so far assumed that skill-biased and
unskill-biased technology shocks are the only shocks that aﬀect the skill premium, and
technology shocks are the only shocks that aﬀect productivity in the long run. Neither
assumption is valid in the presence of exogenous changes in the relative supply of skill,
log(Ht/Lt), because of the standard simultaneity problem in estimating demand and
supply equations, see equation (4).
Suppose a preference shock causes college enrollment to increase permanently or
cheaper child care makes market work more attractive for highly educated parents.
In both cases, the supply of skill increases for reasons unrelated to the production
technology. The increase in skill supply must decrease the skill premium because skill
demand is not aﬀected. Productivity may be aﬀected as well, although the direction of
the eﬀect is ambiguous. On the one hand, the lower skill premium leads ﬁrms to employ
relatively more skilled workers, which tends to raise average labor productivity if skilled
workers are more productive than unskilled workers. On the other hand, diminishing
returns in skilled labor push down productivity.
To make sure that our estimates for skill-biased technology shocks do not include
shocks to the supply of skill, we separately identify skill supply shocks using a second
sign restriction. As opposed to skill-biased technology shocks, which are skill demand
shocks, skill supply shocks aﬀect the price and the quantity of skill in opposite directions.
We exploit this property to identify these shocks. For this purpose, we include a measure
of the relative hours worked of skilled workers in the VAR.3 SKILL-BIASED TECHNOLOGY SHOCKS 19
3.5 Identiﬁed skill-biased technology shocks
Figure 2 shows the responses of the skill premium, relative hours worked of skilled
workers, labor productivity and total hours worked per capita to skill-biased and other
technology shocks from our baseline speciﬁcation using long-run zero and sign restric-
tions. Rows 1 and 2 present the responses if we separately identify skill-biased and
unskill-biased technology shocks, as described in Section 3.3, but ignore shocks to the
supply of skill. In rows 3 to 5 we separately identify these shocks as well, as in Section
3.4. By the identifying assumption, skill-biased technology shocks raise the skill pre-
mium, the relative hours of skilled workers as well as productivity in the long run. In
both cases, the increase is signiﬁcant and fully realized on impact, indicating that all
technology shocks are close to permanent. The eﬀect of skill-biased and other technol-
ogy shocks on productivity is roughly of the same magnitude. Other technology shocks
reduce the skill premium, indicating that these shocks now include improvements in
unskill-biased technology.
Hours worked fall strongly and signiﬁcantly in response to skill-biased improvements
in technology, but not in response to other technological improvements.17 The ﬁnding
that hours fall after a positive technology shocks, ﬁrst documented by Gal´ ı (1999), is
typically interpreted as evidence for price rigidities. Rigid prices dampen the substi-
tution eﬀect on impact and thus make the income eﬀect of higher productivity, which
increases the demand for leisure, dominant in the short run.18 Our results suggest, how-
ever, that part of the fall in hours may be related to the skill bias in these shocks. If high
skilled workers are much more productive than low skilled workers, then it is possible
that by substituting low skilled for high skilled workers in response to an SBT shock,
ﬁrms may increase eﬀective labor input in their production process, while reducing total
hours or employment. In Section 3.6, we explore this mechanism in more detail.
17This ﬁnding is qualitatively unchanged and quantitatively stronger if we separately identify
investment-speciﬁc technology shocks as in Section 4.4.
18An alternative explanation that has been suggested is the combination of habit formation in con-
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The ﬁnding that hours fall in response to skill-biased but not in response to other
technology shocks only becomes apparent when we separate skill supply shocks from
skill-biased technology shocks. The reason is that a decrease in the supply of skill,
which raises the skill premium and therefore satisﬁes the identifying restriction of skill-
biased technology shocks, shifts employment towards unskilled workers. Since unskilled
workers are on average less productive than skilled workers, ﬁrms need to increase overall
hours worked in order to achieve the desired level of production.
Table 2 shows a decomposition of the forecast error variance of the VAR at business
cycle frequencies with periodicities from 8 to 32 quarters. Separating out skill-biased and
other technology shocks increases slightly the overall contribution of technology shocks
to ﬂuctuations. Skill-biased and other technology shocks together explain about 11% of
the business cycle variance of output, compared to about 5% if we identify technology
shocks as in Gal´ ı (1999).19 Technology shocks explain about 18% of the volatility in
hours worked, compared to about 9% in the Gal´ ı (1999) speciﬁcation. Skill-biased
technology shocks are relatively more important for hours worked, but unskill-biased
and skill-neutral shocks explain a larger fraction of ﬂuctuations in output. Fluctuations
in the skill premium are due to skill-biased technology shocks, unskill-biased technology
shocks and skill supply shocks in roughly equal proportions. Skill supply shocks also
explain a sizable share of the variance of output and total hours worked. Overall, we
ﬁnd strong evidence that skill-bias plays an important role in technological change at
business cycle frequencies.
3.6 Wages and hours of high and low skilled workers
By adding additional variables to the VAR, we can evaluate their response to skill-
biased technology shocks. Here, we explore the response of the wages and hours worked
of skilled and unskilled workers separately, in order to provide supportive evidence for
our interpretation for the fall in total hours worked in response to skill-biased technology
19These results are available in the Technical Appendix.3 SKILL-BIASED TECHNOLOGY SHOCKS 21
shocks as a compositional shift in labor demand. Figure 3 presents these responses.
The ﬁrst row in Figure 3 replicates the increase in the skill premium in response to
skill-biased improvements in technology as in Figure 2, and decomposes this increase into
the responses of wages of skilled and unskilled workers. In response to an SBT shock,
the wage of skilled workers increases substantially, while the wage of unskilled workers
almost does not change. According to the point estimate, unskilled workers still beneﬁt a
little from a skill-biased improvement in technology, diﬀerent from what we would expect
if unskilled and skilled workers are more substitutable than complementary. However,
the increase in the wage of unskilled workers is small and insigniﬁcant, consistent with
our interpretation of a compositional shift in labor demand.
In the second row of Figure 3, we look directly at the quantity of labor of each
type that is employed in equilibrium. By our identifying restriction, the relative hours
of skilled workers with respect to unskilled workers increase in response to skill-biased
improvements in technology. This increase is driven by a strong fall in hours of unskilled
workers. Hours of skilled workers respond very little to a skill-biased improvement
in technology. To understand this result, we argue that skill-biased improvements in
technology lead to a shift in the composition of labor demand towards skilled workers.
This compositional shift tends to increase hours of skilled workers and decrease hours
of unskilled workers. In addition, skill-biased technology shocks have the same eﬀect
as other improvements in technology, which is a mild decrease in hours worked. The
combination of the two eﬀects is a sharp drop in hours of unskilled workers, and virtually
no eﬀect on hours of skilled workers.
3.7 Robustness
We now explore the robustness of our estimates to changes in the estimation speciﬁcation
and the construction of the data. The results of this exercise are summarized in Table
3. The fall in hours after a skill-biased technology shock is robust across speciﬁcations.
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but always less than in response to skill-biased technology shocks, consistent with our
interpretation that part of the fall in hours in due to a compositional shift in labor
demand.
To explore whether our results may be driven by low frequency movements in the
data that may not be well described by the model we have in mind, we try various way of
detrending hours worked per capita. We employ a dummy broken at 1997:I, as suggested
by Fernald (2007), ﬁlter the series with a low-pass ﬁlter excluding frequencies above 52
quarters, as in Canova et al. (2010), and include a deterministic polynomial trend (up to
a third order polynomial) into the equation for hours worked. We also check robustness
to including hours worked in levels and to using a shorter sample ending in 2000:IV.
In all of these cases, the results are qualitatively unchanged and largely quantitatively
unchanged.
In our baseline estimates, we impose a prior on the decay of the lag coeﬃcients, see
Section 2.2, in order to be able to include a larger number of lags. However, our results
are not driven by this prior. The responses of productivity and the skill premium to
skill-biased technology shocks are virtually unaltered when we vary the strength of the
prior or when we estimate the VAR using ordinary least squares (OLS).
We also re-estimated the VAR using total hours worked instead of total hours per
capita, and using hours worked from the CPS rather than the usual series from the
establishment survey. The CPS series is much noisier than the baseline series because
the underlying micro-data sample is much smaller, but it is more consistent with our
skill premium series. All results are robust to these alternative series for hours worked.
Next, we explore to what extent the way we constructed our measure for the skill
premium matters for the results. Using a ‘naive’ measure of the skill premium that
does not take into account the heterogeneity over and above two skill types weakens the
results but does not change them qualitatively.
Finally, as shown by Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2007), it is important to include a
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DSGE model.20 Therefore, we try including additional and potentially omitted variables
in the VAR: the relative price of investment goods; consumption, measured as real
personal consumption expenditures from the NIPA; investment, measured consistent
with the series for the relative price; and the interest rate, measured as the return on a
3-month T-bill as in Fisher (2006). Including these variables does not signiﬁcantly alter
any of our results.
4 Capital-skill substitutability
The relative price of investment goods fell substantially over our sample period. This
ﬁnding has been interpreted to mean that technological progress has been faster in in-
vestment goods producing sectors than in consumption goods producing sectors (Green-
wood et al. (1997), Cummins and Violante (2002)). Fisher (2006) argued that this
investment-speciﬁc or investment-biased technological change is important not only for
long-run trends, but also for business cycle ﬂuctuations. Because the increase in the
skill premium roughly coincided with the decrease in the relative price of investment
goods, Krusell et al. (2000) argue that investment-speciﬁc and skill-biased technological
change might be one and the same. If capital and skill are complements in the aggregate
production function, technological innovation in the investment-sector will necessarily
lead to an increase in the demand for skill. If this is the case, then investment-biased
technology shocks should lead to business cycle ﬂuctuations in the skill premium. In
this section, we explore this hypothesis and ﬁnd no evidence for it.
4.1 Skill bias in investment-speciﬁc technology
Consider the alternative aggregate production function (3), as in Krusell et al. (2000),
which allows for complementarity or substitutability between capital and skill. Assuming
20Including additional variables may also alleviate the problem of ﬁnite lag length, see Erceg et al.
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as before that wages are proportional to marginal products in the long run, expression








































Since investment-speciﬁc technological progress raises the long-run capital-labor ratio,
it is clear that such technological change will also raise the skill premium if σ > ρ,
i.e. if capital and skill are complements rather than substitutes in production. As a
result, our identifying restriction that skill-biased technology shocks are the only shocks
that aﬀect the skill premium in the long run is no longer valid unless we control for
investment-speciﬁc shocks. In addition, it is interesting in itself to assess the skill bias
in investment-speciﬁc shocks, because it allows us to assess the degree of capital-skill
complementarity in aggregate production.
We follow Fisher (2006) in identifying investment-biased and investment-neutral
technology shocks using the relative price of investment goods. Investment-biased tech-
nology shocks are the only shocks that aﬀect the relative price of investment goods in
the long run. Investment-neutral technology shocks are all remaining shocks that drive
labor productivity in the long run. For implementation, we include the relative price of
investment in the VAR, ordering it ﬁrst, before labor productivity.
Figure 4 shows the responses of the the skill premium, labor productivity, hours
worked and the relative price of investment goods to investment-biased and investment-
neutral technology shocks. After an improvement in investment-speciﬁc technology, the
relative price of investment falls, productivity rises and hours worked increase. An
investment-neutral technology shock, has no eﬀect on the relative price of investment,
increases productivity and leads to a fall in hours worked.21
21Since productivity increases after an investment-speciﬁc technology shock in our speciﬁcation, we
do not need to use an additional assumption on this eﬀect as in Fisher (2006).4 CAPITAL-SKILL SUBSTITUTABILITY 25
The skill premium falls in response to an improvement in investment-speciﬁc tech-
nology. Thus, we ﬁnd no evidence for complementarity between capital and skill in the
production technology. If anything, capital and skilled labor seem to be more substi-
tutable than capital and unskilled labor. Investment-neutral technology shocks increase
the skill premium, suggesting that these shocks are more often skill-biased than unskill-
biased. We further decompose these shocks into skill-biased and other technology shocks
in Section 4.4 below. There, we also show that the relative hours of skilled workers de-
crease after an investment-speciﬁc improvement in technology, again consistent with
capital-skill substitutability rather than complementarity. Total hours per capita still
fall after skill-biased technology shocks when we include the relative price of investment
into the speciﬁcation.
4.2 Relation to previous literature
Our ﬁndings are in striking contradiction with the argument in Krusell et al. (2000). To
explain the diﬀerence, we need to understand what drives identiﬁcation in their paper
and in ours. From the skill demand equation (5), we see that the skill premium depends
directly on skill-biased and unskill-biased technology as well as on the capital-labor ratio,
which in turn depends on investment-biased technology. Let πt = log(wH,t/wL,t) denote
the skill premium, bt = log(BH,t/BL,t) the combination of skill-biased and unskill-biased
technology shocks and dt investment-biased technology. Then, using a hat to denote
the deviation of a variable from its mean, this relation can be expressed in log-linear
approximation as ˆ πt = ωbˆ bt + ωd ˆ dt, where ωb = (σ − 1)/σ > 0 and ωd > 0 if σ > ρ,
i.e. if the production function exhibits capital-skill complementarity. Suppose we were
to estimate this relation as a univariate regression. Technological change ˆ bt and ˆ dt is
of course unobserved, but investment-biased technology is closely related the relative
price of investment goods, ˆ dt = −ˆ pt, so we could regress ˆ πt = β1ˆ pt + β2t + εt. In
this regression, β1 = −ωd < 0 indicates capital-skill complementarity and the remaining
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neutral technological change, β2t + εt = ωbˆ bt.
The baseline estimates in Krusell et al. (2000) do not allow for skill-biased but
investment-neutral technological change. Imposing β2 = 0, the coeﬃcient β1 is identiﬁed
largely oﬀ the trends in ˆ pt and ˆ πt. Since we know that over the sample period ˆ pt trends
down while ˆ πt trends up, we estimate β1 < 0 and conclude there is evidence for capital-
skill complementarity in this case, as Krusell et al. (2000) do. Of course, the particular
estimation method is not important for this result: whether we estimate the comovement
in ˆ pt and ˆ πt in a univariate regression, in a structural model, as in Krusell et al. (2000),
or in a structural VAR, as in this paper, it is clear that β1 < 0 is necessary to match
the trends in these variables if we impose β2 = 0. However, if we do not impose this
restriction and allow for skill-biased but investment-neutral technological change, then
β1 is no longer identiﬁed oﬀ the trends but oﬀ the higher frequency comovement. Since
after detrending ˆ pt and ˆ πt are positively rather than negatively correlated, we would
now ﬁnd β1 > 0 and conclude that there is evidence for capital-skill substitutability
instead of complementarity, as we do in this paper.22
Lindquist (2004) argues that capital-skill complementarity explains not only the
trends, but also the business cycle ﬂuctuations in the skill premium. He develops a
business cycle model with neutral and investment-speciﬁc technology shocks and eval-
uates this model by comparing its predictions for the (unconditional) moments to the
data, in particular the fact that the skill premium is volatile but acyclical. Lindquist
argues that strong capital-skill complementarity is necessary to explain these facts. In
his model, investment-speciﬁc technological improvements increase the skill premium
whereas neutral improvements in technology decrease the skill premium, in both cases
because of capital-skill complementarity. Since business cycles are driven by both types
of shocks in the model, this makes the skill premium volatile, but roughly acyclical.
22Krusell et al. (2000) estimate a version of their model that allows for a trend in ˆ bt and ﬁnd that
this model can also “account for changes in the skill premium”. They argue, however, that the implied
diﬀerence in the growth rate of productivity of skilled versus unskilled workers of 11%-points per
year makes this interpretation of the data “less compelling than that of capital-skill complementarity”
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It is crucial for Lindquist’s argument that the model has at least two shocks, the
eﬀects of which on the skill premium roughly cancel out against each other. If business
cycles were driven exclusively by investment-speciﬁc shocks, the skill premium would be
strongly procyclical in his model. Although Lindquist presents impulse responses of the
premium to each shock separately from the model, he does not compare the conditional
moments to the data. Our estimated impulse responses show that his model implies
the wrong response of the skill premium to investment-speciﬁc shocks. Another way
to say that is that although the model with capital-skill complementarity captures the
volatility of the skill premium, the implied correlation of the premium with the relative
price of investment goods has the wrong sign. In Section 4.3, we show that Lindquist’s
model can replicate the empirical response of the skill premium to investment-speciﬁc
shocks if we recalibrate the model such that capital and skill are mild substitutes rather
than strong complements in the production function.
4.3 A model with capital-skill substitutability
Our ﬁnding that the skill premium falls in response to investment-speciﬁc shocks suggest
that capital and skill are substitutes rather than complements in the aggregate produc-
tion function. But these responses are measured with error. This raises the question
what range of parameters of production function (3) are consistent with our estimates.
To answer this question, we simulate a simple business cycle model with a production
function as in (3) and compare the estimated impulse response functions from the actual
data to those from simulated data for diﬀerent values of the substitution parameters.23
This procedure also allows us to see whether the structural VAR performs well in cap-
turing the conditional moments of the variables in a model that is consistent with our
23Alternatively we could estimate the model, which would provide a more precise estimate of the
degree of complementarity or substitutability between capital and skill in the production function.
However, in order to do this we would have to make additional assumption about parts of the economy
that are unrelated to the production function. Our test for capital-skill complementarity would then
be a joint test together with these auxiliary assumptions. Therefore, we prefer to focus on the impulse
response that is likely to be most informative about the degree of capital-skill complementarity and
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interpretation of the results.24
The model is a simple real business cycle model with high and low skilled work-
ers. The model is taken from Lindquist (2004) and combines the two sector model of
Greenwood et al. (1997), in which output can be used for consumption or accumulation
of capital equipment, with the model of Krusell et al. (2000) with two skill types and
capital-skill complementarity. Business cycle ﬂuctuations in the model are driven by
shocks to total factor productivity and the relative price of investment goods.
For the calibration of the structural parameters of the model we also follow Lindquist
(2004), but we assume that the two technology shocks are highly persistent and uncor-
related with each other.25 The substitution parameters in the aggregate production
function (3) are σ = 1.67 and ρ = 0.67. These values were estimated by Krusell et al.
(2000) to be consistent with the trends in the relative price of investment goods and
the skill premium. Since ρ < σ in this calibration the aggregate production function
exhibits capital-skill complementarity. In alternative calibrations, we keep σ constant,
because the value of the elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled workers is
well documented, and change ρ to vary the degree of capital skill complementarity. We
consider the cases of capital-skill complementarity (ρ = 0.67), weak complementarity
(ρ = 1.17), neither complementarity nor substitutability (ρ = σ = 1.67), weak sub-
stitutability (ρ = 2.17), substitutability (ρ = 2.67), strong substitutability (ρ = 3.17)
and very strong substitutability (ρ = 5). In each case, we recalibrate the other model
parameters to keep the calibration targets constant.
We simulate the model 1000 times for 110 quarters, the same sample length as in our
24In particular, it allows us to check whether our VAR includes suﬃciently many lags to properly
identify the true model impulse responses, addressing the potential problem with the VAR approach
pointed out by Chari et al. (2008).
25We assume shocks in the model are uncorrelated in order to be consistent with the identifying
assumptions of our VAR. In addition, we are not sure how to interpret the predictions of a structural
model with correlated shocks, which introduce comovement outside of the model. Similar to Uhlig
(2004) we assume persistent, but not permanent, autoregressive processes for the shocks because the
production function does not imply balanced growth. These changes in the calibration with respect
to Lindquist change the simulated data very little, and none of our conclusions change if we follow
Lindquist’s calibration exactly.4 CAPITAL-SKILL SUBSTITUTABILITY 29
data. In each simulation, the model is ﬁrst simulated for 200 periods, which are then
discarded, in order to remove dependence on the initial conditions. We add measurement
error to the simulated variables as we seek to identify two shocks out of four variables
in the VAR. We then estimate the VAR for each sample of 110 quarters and average
the impulse responses across the 1000 simulations. Figure 5 illustrates this for the case
that capital and skill are neither complements nor substitutes. For better comparison,
the responses are normalized such that they match the responses in the actual data of
the investment price and labor productivity to the two technology shocks respectively
10 quarters after the shock has hit. The estimated responses from the simulated data
closely match the theoretical ones from the model.
Figure 6 shows the impulse responses of the skill premium to an investment-biased
shock according to the model for diﬀerent degrees of capital-skill complementarity or
substitutability, as well as the response estimated from the actual data. Comparing
the response of the skill premium to investment-speciﬁc shocks in the actual data to
the responses in the model, we ﬁnd that our estimates are consistent with capital-skill
substitutability or with capital and skill being neither substitutes nor complements.
However, we can reject even weak capital-skill complementarity. Our point estimate
for the long run response of the skill premium suggests an elasticity of substitution
between capital and high skilled labor ρ between 2.67 and 5 which corresponds to strong
substitutability between the two inputs in production.
4.4 Contribution to business cycle ﬂuctuations
When we allow for investment-biased technology shocks, our estimates replicate the
ﬁnding in Fisher (2006) that investment-speciﬁc technology is an important source of
business cycle ﬂuctuations, whereas investment-neutral technology shocks contribute
only a small fraction of ﬂuctuations in output and hours. However, our results indicate
that investment-neutral shocks include technology shocks of diﬀerent types, with distinct
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skill-neutral technology shocks. In addition, we emphasize the potential importance of
shocks to the supply of skilled labor. With the identifying restrictions discussed above,
it is not possible to separately identify all these diﬀerent shocks simultaneously. Recall
that both investment-biased and investment-neutral technology shocks may aﬀect the
skill premium. Similarly, both skill-biased and skill-neutral or unskill-biased technology
shocks may aﬀect the relative price of investment goods.
To separately identify as many shocks as we can, we use a recursive identiﬁcation
scheme, identifying ﬁrst investment-biased technology shocks as all shocks that aﬀect the
relative price of investment goods. Then, skill supply shocks, skill-biased and other tech-
nology shocks are identiﬁed as all remaining shocks that aﬀect the skill premium in the
long run and satisfy their respective sign restrictions, excluding shocks that aﬀect both
the relative price of investment and the skill premium. Therefore, the estimated fraction
of the variance in aggregate variables that is due to skill supply shocks and skill-biased
technology shocks should be interpreted as a lower bound on the actual contribution of
these shocks to business cycle ﬂuctuations. Figure 7 shows the impulse responses to the
various technology shocks from this joint identiﬁcation strategy. Comparing the results
in this ﬁgure to the responses to skill-biased and other technology shocks in Figure 2, it
is clear that the results do not change much, with hours worked still falling signiﬁcantly
in response to investment-neutral, skill-biased technology shocks.
Table 4 shows the variance decomposition of the forecast error variance in output,
hours, the skill premium and relative hours of skilled workers. Investment-speciﬁc tech-
nology shocks explain between 30 and 40% of the volatility in output at business cycle
frequencies, consistent with earlier ﬁndings in the literature (Fisher (2006), Canova et
al. (2010)). Although investment-neutral technology shocks explain only a small frac-
tion of about 5% of the forecast variance of output, these shocks are important for
ﬂuctuations in hours worked, explaining about 23% of the volatility of hours per capita,
about two thirds of which is due to skill-biased technology shocks. Skill supply shocks
also explain a non-negligible part of about 10% of ﬂuctuations in hours. Investment-5 CONCLUSION 31
speciﬁc technology shocks explain only about 8% of the volatility of hours, less than
skill-biased but investment-neutral shocks. Investment-speciﬁc shocks play virtually no
role for ﬂuctuations in the skill premium, with skill-biased technology shocks and skill
supply shocks together explaining over 60% of the variance in that variable and other
technology shocks (including unskill-biased shocks) about 10%.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we explored the implications of skill bias in technological change for
business cycle ﬂuctuations. We constructed a quarterly time series for the skill premium
using micro-data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) outgoing rotation groups,
and used it to identify skill-biased technology shocks in a structural VAR with long-
run zero and sign restrictions. We documented two main diﬀerences between skill-
biased and other technology shocks. First, the fall in hours in response to investment-
neutral improvements in productivity is driven at least in part by the skill-bias in these
shocks. Second, investment-speciﬁc improvements in technology are biased towards
unskilled labor, indicating that capital and skill are substitutes rather than complements
in the aggregate production process. Both ﬁndings have important implications for the
interpretation of well-known results in the literature.
The fall in hours worked in response to technology shocks, as documented by Gal´ ı
(1999), has typically been interpreted as evidence for price rigidities. Having access to
an improved production technology, which reduces marginal costs, a ﬁrm would like to
reduce prices in order to increase sales. If prices are rigid however, the ﬁrm adjusts
labor input in order to produce the amount it can sell. Our results cast doubt on
this interpretation. We document a drop in hours worked in response to skill-biased
technological improvements. This ﬁnding suggests that at least part of the fall in hours
is driven by a compositional change in labor demand. In response to a skill-biased
improvement in technology, ﬁrms increase their relative demand for skilled labor. Since5 CONCLUSION 32
high skilled workers are on average more productive than low skilled workers, eﬀective
labor input may increase even if total hours worked fall.
Our conclusion that capital and skill are substitutes in the aggregate production
function, is based on our ﬁnding that the skill premium falls in response to investment-
biased technology shocks. If capital and skill are complements, as Krusell et al. (2000)
argue, we would expect the demand for skill and therefore the skill premium to increase
in response to investment-biased improvements in technology.
Is it reasonable to think that capital and skill are complements, substitutes or nei-
ther? Clearly, the answer depends on the type of capital and therefore the time period
under consideration. In the industrial revolution, new production technologies often
involved machines that could be operated by unskilled workers and replaced skilled la-
borers.26 Regarding more recent technological developments, Autor et al. (2003) make
the point that computer capital complements workers performing nonroutine problem-
solving tasks, but substitutes labor in “cognitive and manual tasks that can be accom-
plished by following explicit rules.” Since both nonroutine and routine tasks may be
performed by either skilled or unskilled workers, the aggregate elasticity of substitu-
tion between capital and skill may vary with the task composition of the workforce.
Our results indicate that over the last 20 years, technological improvements in capital
substituted skilled workers more than unskilled workers. The reason that the skill pre-
mium nevertheless increased over this period, is due to investment-neutral technological
progress, which was biased towards skilled labor.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that we use a broad interpretation of what
constitutes ‘technological’ change. For example, Philippon and Reshef (2010) show
that ﬁnancial deregulation dramatically increased the demand for skilled labor in the
ﬁnancial sector over the 1980-2010 period. In our estimates, this change in regulation
is indistinguishable from a skill-biased change in technology. Moreover, if deregulation
26For example, hand weavers, a skilled profession, opposed the adoption of weaving machinery, going
so far as destroying these machines, because many of them lost their jobs and the others were forced
to accept lower wages (Noble et al. (2002), p.701).5 CONCLUSION 33
aﬀected not only the type, but also the total amount of services provided by the ﬁnancial
sector, then it may even look like there is capital-skill substitutability in aggregate
production (assuming the ﬁnancial sector uses less capital than rest of the economy),
because the relative demand for skilled labor rises while the relative demand for capital
goods falls.REFERENCES 34
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Std Correlation with
Output Hours Productivity Price
Baseline measure
Skill premium .0066 0.1131 0.0114 0.1763 -0.1535
Relative hours .0183 -0.4124* -0.2917* -0.2591* 0.5838*
Naive measure
Skill premium .0071 0.0962 0.1989* -0.1853 0.0852
Relative hours .0161 -0.4242* -0.3533* -0.1688 0.5418*
Relative supply .0111 -0.0220 0.0400 -0.0761 0.2756*
Notes: Data series are constructed as explained in section 2.3 and seasonally adjusted using
X-12-ARIMA. The series are HP-ﬁltered with λ=1600. The * indicates signiﬁcance of at least 5%.Table 2: Variance decomposition with skill-biased and
other technology shocks
Horizon 8 16 32
output
SBT shock 3.09 3.09 3.09
(0.5,15.8) (0.4,16.2) (0.4,16.3)
other T shock 8.29 7.51 7.38
(0.8,29.1) (0.8,27.8) (0.7,27.5)
supply shock 23.94 23.09 22.84
(7.2,6.8) (6.8,44.3) (6.6,44.2)
total hours
SBT shock 14.11 12.83 12.24
(2.3,34.6) (1.9,32.9) (1.8,32.5)
other T shock 5.83 5.41 5.32
(0.9,19.8) (0.7,18.8) (0.6,18.6)
supply shock 19.62 19.50 19.44
(5.2,39.5) (5.1,39.8) (5.0,39.8)
premium
SBT shock 24.69 22.38 20.81
(3.6,71.6) (2.3,69.2) (1.5,67.7)
other T shock 17.80 19.47 20.09
(1.8,58.8) (1.6,60.4) (1.3,61.9)
supply shock 32.93 36.32 38.29
(3.1,66.0) (3.3,70.6) (3.2,73.1)
relative hours
SBT shock 10.82 10.35 10.20
(1.8,44.3) (1.3,45.0) (1.0,46.5)
other shock 32.83 34.17 34.26
(3.5,73.5) (3.3,77.7) (3.0,79.9)
supply shock 32.02 35.07 36.77
(4.9,74.3) (5.4,79.1) (5.5,81.3)
Notes: Numbers are in percents; the contribution of all shocks, including the (omitted)
residual shock, adds up to 100% at each horizon. We report posterior medians and 68%
Bayesian conﬁdence bands from the posterior distribution.Table 3: Robustness of the response of hours to skill-biased and other
technology shocks
SBT shock other technology shocks
Baseline speciﬁcation
-, insigniﬁcant -, sign. before 5th quarter
with supply shocks -, signiﬁcant -, insigniﬁcant
Variation of the baseline speciﬁcation with supply shocks
Taking into account low frequency variation in hours
dummy1 -, signiﬁcant - on impact, insign.
low-pass trend -, signiﬁcant - on impact, insign.
polyn. trend -, signiﬁcant - on impact, insign.
hours in levels -, insigniﬁcant +, signiﬁcant
subsample stability
1979:I-2000:IV -, signiﬁcant +, sign. after 5th quarter
Minnesota prior with 8 lags changed to
2 lags -, signiﬁcant - on impact, insign.
4 lags -, signiﬁcant -, insigniﬁcant
12 lags -, signiﬁcant -, signiﬁcant
weaker prior2 -, signiﬁcant -, insigniﬁcant
Flat prior (OLS equivalent)
2 lags -, signiﬁcant -, insigniﬁcant
4 lags -, insigniﬁcant -, insigniﬁcant
Alternative and additional variables
CPS hours -, sign. on impact -, insigniﬁcant
total hours -, signiﬁcant -, insigniﬁcant
Naive wage premium -, signiﬁcant -, insigniﬁcant
Baseline + invest. price -, signiﬁcant -, insigniﬁcant
the above + investment -, signiﬁcant - on impact, insign.
the above + consumption -, signiﬁcant - on impact, insign.
the above + interest rate -, sign. on impact -, signiﬁcant
Notes: 1) dummy break at 1997:I; 2) Decay parameter d = 1 instead of d = 3 as in the baseline.Table 4: Variance decomposition with investment-biased,
skill-biased and other technology shocks
Horizon 8 16 32
output
IBT shock 41.57 33.94 28.97
(21.6,57.5) (15.9,51.4) (10.6,47.6)
SBT shock 2.8 3.4 3.8
(0.4,11.1) (0.5,13.9) (0.5,15.9)
other T shock 2.0 2.3 2.5
(0.4,7.5) (2.3,8.6) (0.3,9.6)
supply shock 8.09 8.22 8.75
(2.0,19.3) (1.9,20.6) (1.9,22.3)
total hours
IBT shock 11.66 8.26 6.85
(2.4,30.2) (2.9,18.7) (2.4,17.5)
SBT shock 14.2 14.6 14.9
(1.7,34.3) (1.8,34.6) (1.8,35.2)
other T shock 8.6 8.0 7.9
(1.2,25.2) (1.0,24.7) (0.9,25.1)
supply shock 10.50 10.46 10.54
(1.5,29.1) (1.4,29.2) (1.4,29.8)
premium
IBT shock 2.41 4.93 8.00
(0.9,7.3) (1.3,14.3) (1.1,19.3)
SBT shock 37.37 32.7 27.8
(8.44,81.55) (6.10,77.70) (4.29,74.80)
other T shock 9.34 9.97 10.06
(0.95,50.55) (0.87,51.59) (0.69,51.69)
supply shock 27.52 29.72 31.01
(2.0,55.5) (2.3,56.5) (2.5,56.9)
relative hours
IBT shock 38.15 48.84 50.72
(26.48,50.3) (33.02,59.5) (33.52,63.0)
SBT shock 8.04 7.52 7.52
(1.18,33.3) (1.01,29.7) (0.98,29.5)
other T shock 15.02 12.04 10.58
(1.96,42.2) (1.43,36.9) (1.16,35.5)
supply shock 18.22 16.56 16.14
(3.16,43.1) (2.96,38.9) (2.93,38.1)
Notes: Numbers are in percents; the contribution of all shocks, including the
(omitted) residual shock, adds up to 100% at each horizon. We report
medians and 68% Bayesian conﬁdence bands from the posterior distribution.Figure 1: Impulse-responses to technology shocks from the production









































































































Notes: All responses are in percent to a positive one-standard-deviation shock.
The ﬁrst two rows show impulse-responses from regressing the variables on six lags of the production
function residual and the SBT and UBT shock from the SVAR. The black dotted line repeats the
estimate from the ﬁrst row. Conﬁdence intervals are one standard error bands.
The third and fourth row show the responses to SBT and UBT as well as SNT shocks estimated
within the SVAR. Here, conﬁdence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands.Figure 2: Impulse-responses to technology shocks from a VAR with






















































































































































Notes: Percent responses to a positive one-standard-deviation shock. Conﬁdence intervals are 68%
Bayesian bands. The ﬁrst two rows show the results from the identiﬁcation without supply shocks,










































Notes: Percent response to a positive one-standard-deviation shock. Conﬁdence intervals are 68%




























































Notes: Percent responses to a positive one-standard-deviation shock. Conﬁdence intervals are 68%





























































Notes: Percent responses to a positive one-standard-deviation shock. The dashed lines represent
the theoretical responses from the model with ρ = σ = 1.67. The solid lines are the estimated
responses from 1000 simulations of 110 quarters each of the same model. The responses are
normalized to match the responses of the investment price and labor productivity in the
actual data in the longer run (20 quarters).Figure 6: Capital-skill substitutability?

















Notes: Black line depicts response of the premium from the estimated
structural VAR with actual data together with the Bayesian 68% conﬁdence
bands (red dotted lines). The dashed lines show the responses from the














































































































































Notes: Percent responses to a positive one-standard-deviation shock. Conﬁdence intervals are 68% Bayesian bands.